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Ubiquitous Privacy Protection
Position Paper
Abstract The main message of this position paper is
that ubiquitous computing technology need not neces-
sarily be an obstacle to privacy protection: if legal and
social issues are given proper consideration, technology
can also be used to allow individuals to exercise their
rights. We believe that the key issue is to devise tech-
niques able to support ambitious privacy protection poli-
cies while allowing for the ﬂexibility required in the ambi-
ent intelligence context. We illustrate our position using
three technical requirements: (1) formal speciﬁcation of
privacy policies, (2) trust management and (3) auditabil-
ity, which show both the challenges posed by ubiquitous
computing and the opportunities to strengthen privacy.
For each of these requirements, we present the legal and
social motivations, suggest technical challenges and pro-
vide hints on possible solutions based on our on-going
work.
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1 Introduction
Privacy is a complex and multi-faceted notion, both from
the social and the legal points of view and it has been
interpreted in various ways depending on times, cultures
and individual perceptions. Privacy is also very much
dependent on technology, as evidenced by the motiva-
tion put forward by Warren and Brandeis in their semi-
nal paper [18] back in 1890 - namely the growing use of
photography - and, more than one century later, by the
increased concerns about privacy raised by the perspec-
tives of ubiquitous computing. In each case, technology
plays the role of the villain, the recurrent source of new
privacy threats. The position that we put forward here
is that technology should not necessarily always be on
the wrong side, and that the technical characteristics of
ubiquitous computing can also be exploited to extend
privacy protection. Obviously, privacy cannot be guaran-
teed by purely technical means, especially in the context
of ubiquitous computing: a combination of legal, social
and technological ingredients is required, but technology
can and should be designed from the outset with privacy
requirements in mind. In other words, if it is true that
regulation should in some sense be “technology neutral”,
technology does not have to be neutral w.r.t. regulation
or society; technology should serve the social and the
public interests as manifested in regulations.
One of the main diﬃculties with privacy is that it
cannot be absolute, especially in a world of “disappear-
ing computers”. It has to be balanced with other rights
(e.g. free speech), obligations (e.g. data retention), prin-
ciples (e.g. liberty) and interests (e.g. personalized ser-
vices, convenience). This observation does not imply that
technical protections have to be weak; on the contrary,
they have to be strong, but ﬂexible. Technology can and
should support legal and social regulations as much as
possible, while accounting for the variety of situations
and complexities of the “ambient intelligence” world.
In this abstract, we focus on three technical require-
ments: (1) formal speciﬁcation of the privacy policy, (2)
trust management and (3) auditability. We choose these
2three because they illustrate both challenges posed by
ubiquitous computing and opportunities to strengthen
privacy. In addition, these requirements apply to the
three main stages of communication in ambient intel-
ligence scenarios:
1. The privacy policy model for a users device is deﬁned
beforehand, and serves as a reference for all interac-
tion decisions that the device takes.
2. Trust comes into play when a users device interacts
with other devices: the devices trust management
unit assesses potential risks, given the current con-
text, and grants access rights to the other devices in
consequence.
3. Auditability is useful after an interaction, as a means
to verify that past actions by the device were consis-
tent with the privacy policy and the granted rights.
This is also useful as input for future trust manage-
ment decisions.
We review these three technical requirements in, re-
spectively, Sections 2, 3 and 4. For each requirement, we
present the legal and social motivation, suggest technical
challenges and then provide hints on possible solutions
based on our on-going work. Section 5 draws some con-
clusions and points out further legal issues.
2 Requirement for a formal privacy policy model
2.1 Legal and social motivation
Most legal instruments for privacy protection explicitly
refer to the unambiguous consent of the data owner as
one of the conditions for the collection of personal data
(see, e.g., Article 7 of [16]). However, consent of the data
owner can be deemed unambiguous only if the informa-
tion on which such consent is based is also unambiguous.
This prerequisite is far from obvious considering the in-
trinsic complexities of privacy issues and the lack of clar-
ity of certain privacy claims or declarations. The discus-
sions concerning privacy statements in languages such
as P3P and their potential inconsistencies show that a
formal semantics for such languages is urgently needed.
This need is even more striking in the ubiquitous
computing context where the data owner does not want
his consent to be requested before each individual data
communication: in some sense, it could even be seen as
contradictory with the basic assumption of “disappear-
ing computers” and the idea of interactions carried out
behind the user’s back. This should not imply that the
user is unable to control, even indirectly, such data trans-
fers however. Nonetheless, the eﬀective control of his per-
sonal data by the user and the legal value of his consent
must rely on the existence of a precise privacy policy that
has been deﬁned beforehand, understood and accepted
without ambiguity. Such policy, which can be seen as
a form of “generic (and conditional) consent”, may be
rather complex given the variety of situations to be con-
sidered.
Another signiﬁcant reason for avoiding ambiguities
in the statement of privacy policies is the liability of the
data controller (the legal person who determines the pur-
poses and means of the processing of personal data) for
damages suﬀered by the data owner as a result of unlaw-
ful processing of personal data (see, e.g., Article 23 of
[16]). Indeed, the liability of the data controller may be
very diﬃcult to enforce if his commitments, as expressed
within the privacy policy, are undermined by inconsis-
tencies or imprecisions.
In addition to the legal requirement, the delivery of a
clear and consistent information to the data owner will
obviously increase his trust in the system and make him
less reluctant to let his personal data be automatically
released and processed by devices which are out of his
control.
2.2 Technological issues
As already illustrated for decades in the programming
languages area [15,13], formal semantics have at least
two major beneﬁts: (1) they make it possible to assign a
deﬁnite meaning to each statement in a language, and
(2) they pave the way for the design of a variety of
well-founded tools (such as program analyzers, property
checkers, program transformers, etc.). Such beneﬁts would
be very much welcomed in the context of privacy pol-
icy languages as well: examples of useful features in-
clude conformance checking (e.g. checking whether the
privacy policy of a potential data recipient conforms to
the privacy requirements of the data owner), consistency
checking (detecting inconsistencies or suspicious conﬁg-
urations in privacy policies), verifying the compliance of
an implementation with respect to privacy statements,
etc.
This is not to say, however, that the application to
privacy policy languages of techniques devised for the
formal speciﬁcation of programming languages is straight-
forward. Indeed, deﬁning privacy policies in a precise
and unambiguous way is not an easy task, especially in
the ambient intelligence world where many diﬀerent con-
texts, actors, types of data and devices have to be consid-
ered. Examples of notions that must be handled include:
purpose (of data processing), conditional rights (granted
to the data controller), obligations (required from the
data controller), revocations (e.g. decision from the data
owner to revoke a right), time (e.g. delay for the right
to keep data), etc. In addition, as argued in Sections 3
and 4, complex notions such as trust, auditability and li-
ability are also desirable features of a privacy policy lan-
guage. Last but not least, a mathematical model is not
enough to reach the objectives set forth in the previous
subsection: individuals should not be expected to under-
stand mathematics, hence formal speciﬁcations should
3be translated into understandable text in a natural lan-
guage (or conveyed through any other user-friendly in-
terface).
2.3 Technological solutions
In order to tackle the issues raised in the previous sub-
section, we have designed a formal system which relies
on the very notions of trust and auditability [6,3] dis-
cussed in Sections 3 and 4. The trust management part
of the system is based on the RT0 language [12]. The
proof system for trust management deﬁnes the rules for
establishing credential formulae such as “A asserts that
D is a member of A.friends” where “A” denotes a prin-
cipal and “friends” a role. The system makes it possible
to express diﬀerent forms of delegations (delegation to a
principal, to all principals of a role, partial delegation,
etc.).
The semantics of privacy policies can be established
based on the state of the trust management system. The
privacy policies are sticky in the sense that each data
comes with its policy and this policy governs its use as
well as its distribution. The proof system for privacy
policies deﬁnes the conditions under which a principal
is authorized to receive a data, to keep it and to send
it to another principal. A signiﬁcant feature of the sys-
tem is that an agent is authorized to receive data only
from trusted principals. Last but not least, as argued
in Section 4, the privacy policies are not assumed to be
enforced a priori but can be implemented a posteriori,
through the checking of audit logs.
The ﬁrst version of the system [6,3] has been kept
minimal, for theoretical purposes, but several extensions
are currently under investigation, including the introduc-
tion of obligations and the management of reputation
based trust (in addition to the current rule based trust
management - see Subsection 3.2).
3 Requirement for trust management
3.1 Legal and social motivation
Humans use trust daily to promote interaction and ac-
cept risk in situations where they have only partial infor-
mation. Actually, the notions of privacy and trust have
various connections:
– At the “operational level”, trust is a social parameter
for risk management; it helps in the decision making
process, for example to decide whether or not per-
sonal data should be communicated. Until recently,
trust was established through direct, face-to-face, in-
teractions. Nowadays, in the global connected society,
alternative methods for establishing trust are needed.
– At the “philosophical level”, it has been argued that
one of the ﬁrst values encapsulated by privacy was
to contribute to the well-being and trustworthiness
of people, especially in the context of their social re-
lationships.
Thus, trust helps maintain privacy, which in turn
strengthens trust. However, establishing trust may also
aﬀect privacy since a minimal amount of information has
to be provided to initiate trust (bootstrapping process).
This illustrates again the fact that privacy should not be
without limits: the extreme scenario where no one agrees
to release personal information would completely under-
mine trust and thus endanger one of the very foundations
of privacy itself.
From the legal point of view, the notion of trust un-
derlies several notions such as “burden of proof”, “min-
imal care” or “good faith”. For example, the trust in
an electronic signature satisfying legal requirements (e.g.
use of a certiﬁed signature device and established certiﬁ-
cate provider) is considered high enough to place the
burden of proof on the party questioning the validity of
the proof. In the same vein, individuals receiving per-
sonal data from a completely unknown third party could
be accused of lack of care (just as a consumer buying
counterfeited products in the street). It has also been ar-
gued that privacy protection has been aﬀorded in USA
courts on the basis of “breach of implied contract or of
a trust or conﬁdence” [18]. Obviously, such qualiﬁcation
remains under the judges’s appraisal, but any piece of
evidence substantiating this notion of trust could be of
value in the decision process.
3.2 Technological issues
Regarding the protection privacy problem from a trust
management point of view appears as a reasonable solu-
tion in a distributed framework such as ubiquitous com-
puting where no control from a central authority can be
assumed. Trust management can be a way to help indi-
viduals taking decisions on whether or not to consent to
the processing of their private data. Two notions of trust
are usually distinguished (see [14] for comprehensive pre-
sentation): conﬁding and reliability trust. Conﬁding is a
merely passive attitude, corresponding to the case where
certain negative events are expected not to take place.
On the other hand, reliability trust can be seen, follow-
ing Gambetta [8], as “the subjective probability by which
an individual expects that another individual performs
a given action on which his own welfare depends”. Con-
ﬁding and reliability trust can be implemented by two
diﬀerent trust management frameworks: conﬁding is ad-
dressed by rule based trust management while reliability
trust is addressed by reputation based trust management
(as already put into practice by commercial sites such as
eBay).
4Rule based trust management falls in the area of ac-
cess control. The adaptation to decentralized collabora-
tive systems of solutions available for centralized systems
is very challenging, especially when considering ambient
intelligence environments. On the other hand, in order
to be socially acceptable, reputation based trust man-
agement systems must provide eﬀects close to the hu-
man perception of trust. They must also be able to cap-
ture the dynamics of trust, taking into account not only
the performed interactions but also the social context of
those interactions.
In addition, any trust management framework for
ambient intelligence requires a minimal exchange of per-
sonal data. As shown in the next subsection, several so-
lutions are possible to limit the risks resulting from such
disclosure: limitation of the quantity of information, of
its quality, or of the associated use rights.
3.3 Technological solutions
Our trust management framework is based on the notion
of communication history [7] : after a successful interac-
tion, each node builds a proof of interaction signed by
both parties. Each node then keeps in its history this
common certiﬁcate to cryptographically prove that the
interaction has taken place (and, implicitly, to the sat-
isfaction of both parties). These certiﬁcates are used to
build trust with other devices based upon their numbers
of interactions with common parties (parties which have
had successful interactions with the two nodes). More
information can also be added to the certiﬁcates to fur-
ther qualify the interactions (including, e.g., information
about the level of satisfaction of the parties). The cer-
tiﬁcate could also contain a contract between the two
entities including beacons, time-stamping information,
localization information, and various constraints on use
rights (e.g. time constraints or localization constraints).
In our framework, the quantity of personal data com-
municated during the trust establishment process is lim-
ited by the use of an iterative protocol allowing the user
to disclose his data gradually according to dynamically
computed trust levels. This iterative process can also
take into account the current context. The level of qual-
ity of the information can be adapted through the use
of pseudonyms. Each node is allocated a unique iden-
tity and a set of derived pseudonyms that can be used
to build certiﬁcates without revealing the identity of the
node. In addition, the nodes can report bad behaviors
to the authority, which is able to establish the iden-
tity of the incriminated node, blacklist it with all its
pseudonyms and forward this information to all other
nodes. Needless to say, the authority is not assumed to
be permanently accessible.
4 Requirement for auditability
4.1 Legal and social motivation
Classical mechanisms for the protection of conﬁdential
data are preventive, in the sense that unauthorized ac-
tions are prevented from occurring. Preventive measures
can be very successful and should be used whenever pos-
sible. However, both for technical and legal reasons, they
should be complemented with a posteriori measures such
as auditing, especially in the context of ubiquitous com-
puting. First, relying exclusively on preventive (or a pri-
ori) controls would not be realistic for certain applica-
tions because the system would necessarily be:
– Either inconvenient, because it would not tolerate
any exceptions and would thus deprive the user of
many potential interactions or repeatedly require his
consent before authorizing them; or,
– Ineﬀective, either because the user, tired with re-
peated consent queries, would systematically give his
consent or because, in order to alleviate this problem,
the system would have to implement a much weaker
privacy policy.
The crux of the problem is that a strict and precise
preventive control mechanism requires a complete deci-
sion procedure to establish whether a certain action is
allowed or not, and such a complete decision procedure
cannot be eﬀectively implemented since it depends on
vague concepts such as the “purpose” of an action. In
addition, preventive approaches cannot deal with con-
ﬂicting requirements that often arise when policies and
regulations are emanated by diﬀerent authorities; nor
can they cope with unforeseen interactions, which are
very common in ambient intelligence.
From a social point of view, knowing that a company
or a third party is auditable obviously increases the trust
of the individuals and their willingness to enter into in-
teractions. In addition, ensuring that individuals can be
held accountable for their actions can have a strong de-
terrence eﬀect and we believe that, in certain situations,
deterring illegitimate behaviors can be almost as eﬀective
as preventing them, with the great advantage of being
much more ﬂexible.
From the legal perspective, international instruments
such as the European Directive 95/46/EC [16] explicitly
refer to the accountability and liability of the data con-
troller. Generally speaking, the preventive (incentive or
deterrence) eﬀects of regulation may depend a lot on the
actual possibilities of legal action, and these possibilities
depend in turn on the availability of evidence that can
be used in legal proceedings.
4.2 Technological issues
Auditing can be a valid substitute to preventive access
control in that it can implement a form of a posteriori
5access control: a system in which policy infringements
are not prevented, but are systematically logged and de-
tected. An advantage of a posteriori access control is that
it makes it possible to deﬁne more expressive and pow-
erful privacy policies, including, e.g. conditions on the
future use of personal data by the recipient. It is thus
another example of the application of the technology to
strengthen the rights of the individuals.
Systematic use of auditing to achieve compliance con-
trol may seem futuristic, but we believe it is bound to
happen. To realize this, a number of technical issues have
to be addressed. First, completeness : auditing can never
be a fully automated process because the decision of
whether an action constitutes an infringement is often
based on factors (such as the social context) that cannot
be evaluated by an automatic system. Therefore, audit-
ing systems will have to isolate dubious cases that may
require human intervention. Also, a necessary balance
has to be found with respect to the amount of informa-
tion recorded because logging too much data could in
some cases be considered in itself as a breach of privacy.
Secondly, eﬀectiveness : in the presence of dubious cases,
the problem of false positives may be a limiting factor in
the eﬀectiveness of automatic auditing. A third challenge
is bridging the gap between policies and events. While
privacy policies are expressed in terms of high-level con-
cepts (e.g., disclosure, purpose, etc), logging is usually
carried out by collecting low-level events (IP packets, ﬁle
accesses etc). The diﬃculty here is determining which
policies may be infringed by an event and whether the
event actually constitutes an infringement.
Concerning the expressiveness of the auditing (i.e.
the amount of information what should be collected and
logged), it should allow checking of compliance to policies
that include conditional rights and obligations, revoca-
tions, time constraints, etc. Finally, logging and auditing
are techniques that require a substantial amount of re-
sources both in terms of storage and computing power;
the limited resources of typical ubiquitous computing de-
vices is thus an additional diﬃculty to implement an
a posteriori control system.
Next to the technical challenges, there are the legal
and social ones. In particular, so long as audit logs have
no validity as evidence in court, their eﬀectiveness as de-
terrents is bound to be limited. One of the key require-
ments that audit logs will have to satisfy to achieve this
aim is security (especially integrity and authenticity).
4.3 Technological solutions
In order to address some of the issues raised in the previ-
ous subsection, we have deﬁned a logic for accountability
[2,3], the formal basics of a posteriori compliance control
[6], and a logical framework for assessing log systems [5].
These systems address in particular the formal questions
underlying the structure and meaning of auditing as a
way to enforce compliance control. As mentioned before,
this technology can help strengthening privacy and the
trust of the individuals also because it can be driven by
the individual himself and used for instance to discover
a posteriori how some private information has actually
been used by a third party.
Still unexplored are the practical issues related to the
design and deployment of the logging and accountability
systems. Particularly challenging seems the realization of
automatic auditing authorities with low “false positive”
rates. Another crucial issue that is currently under study
is the scalability of the process with solutions based on
the relaxation of the conditions under which actions have
to be kept in the audit log.
As set forth in the previous subsection, a key require-
ment for auditing is that logged data be stored securely.
We are investigating this issue using the notion of trusted
hardware. An example of a general purpose hardware is
the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) [17]. Currently, the
TPM is used to store digests of the code loaded on a
platform; the TPM data thus allows the remote party
to verify that the platform is not running compromised
code. There are three aspects to the usefulness of the
TPM for privacy enforcement. First, the TPM can be
used to securely store hashes of any data on a device, and
attest the hash to other devices. The TPM can thus be
used to store secure hashes of audit logs. Second, TPMs
store keys that never leave the trustworthy conﬁnes of
the TPM; these keys can be used for secure identity
management and authentication. Third, the attestation
feature can be used to validate any privacy enforcement
software running on a device. Thus, a device A might
only decide to interact with B if B is able to attest that
it is running the correct version of a privacy policy en-
gine. This is also important for detecting viruses, since
privacy violations can arise from virus-infected software
as easily as through the actions of malicious users.
Fundamentally, auditing for privacy entails record-
ing the actions of entities in relation to the exchange
of information. Sometimes information can be identiﬁed
through the storage device that contains it. In this case,
RFID technology can be exploited to trace the movement
of the storage device. For paper printouts of personal
information, RFID can also be used. In February 2007
Hitachi unveiled a RFID tag measuring 0.05x0.05mm,
thus thin enough to be embedded in a sheet of paper.
Thus, tags can even be used to track paper documents
from the moment that they leave the printer1. This is
another example of where an ambient computing tech-
nology, criticized for the threat it poses to privacy, can
also be exploited as a privacy enforcing technology.
1 Obviously, such scenario may still suﬀer from the “ana-
logue hole” if tagged documents can be copied on untagged
sheets of paper, but the purpose of the solutions outlined here
is to lift up the level of diﬃculty to breach privacy policies,
rather than to provide deﬁnite (or even extremely strong) se-
curity guarantees, so that breaching actors cannot easily use
good faith arguments for their defence.
65 Conclusion
For the sake of conciseness, we have focused on three
technologies that we believe are of signiﬁcant impor-
tance for reconciling privacy and ubiquitous computing.
In each case, we have suggested how the technology can
be used to extend privacy protection while allowing for
the ﬂexibility required by the ambient intelligence con-
text. Obviously, this is not to minimize the value of
many other techniques (such as anonymity, cryptogra-
phy, authentication or proximity based techniques) that
should be part of any privacy friendly ubiquitous envi-
ronment. Another fundamental issue not covered here is
the privacy architecture that integrates these techniques
([10,11]). This notion of privacy architecture is especially
important in the PRIAM project2 which is following a
top-down approach: starting from the legal requirements,
we successively derive requirements for a privacy policy
model and its implementation.
Although the main focus in this abstract is on techno-
logical issues, we do not want to suggest that technology
can solve all problems. Indeed, further legal protection
is desirable to ensure that the technical solutions put
forward here are viable. For example, the legal value of
transactions conducted by electronic means (such as a
partially automated user consent, decisions based on au-
tomatic trust evaluation or on automated audits) has
to be established. This also holds for “privacy enhanc-
ing tools” [1], as recently acknowledged by the European
Commission [4].
To conclude, the main message that we want to con-
vey through this position paper is that technology need
not necessarily be an obstacle for privacy protection: if
legal and social issues are considered from the outset [9],
then technology can also be used to allow individuals to
exercise their rights. Just to take a few ﬁnal examples:
the privacy policy system sketched in Section 4 can be
used to implement a data tracking tool, allowing an indi-
vidual to check who has received his personal data and,
if he so desires, to ask him to correct or erase it; tools
can also be designed for negotiating privacy policies and
adapting the amount of personal information delivered
(including reverting from identity to pseudonym or to
anonymity) or for verifying (or assisting in the veriﬁca-
tion of) the conformance of a published policy statement
with the actual implementation (e.g. within a certiﬁca-
tion or an audit process).
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